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A government of Laws, not of Men. 
-John Adams' 
I. Introduction 
The implementation of the Security Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 as well 
as the subsequent addition of Security Exchange Commission Rules w(b)s and 
w(b)5-1 concretized a legal prohibition on "insider trading". Insider trading refers 
generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a legal duty or other 
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, non public 
information about the security2 • 
Simply, this means that if someone comes to possess information that 
would persuade a reasonable person to trade on a security and that information is 
not publicly available, they cannot trade on the information if they acquired it by 
virtue of their position. The salient harm these proscriptions seek to redress is the 
"fraud on the market" theory, or, the corruption of the integrity of a given market 
by deceptive practices. Withholding material information therefore, would 
influence a shareholder to act a certain way and therefore cause pecuniary injury. 
Aside from the economic consequences of such conduct, the moral 
reprehensibility of such a practice is self-evident: it is contrary to the objectively 
fair purposes of the market. Each participant should be subject to the same risk as 
every other participant. 
1 Adams, John. Thoughts on Government. 1776. 
2 Insider Trading U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, accessed February 21, 2012 
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Although this ban on insider trading was considered illegal, there was no 
direct, codified ban on the practice until2ooo. In 2ooo, SEC Rule w(b)s-r was 
enacted which definitively prohibited the practice of insider trading. It reads: 
The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section 1o(b) of the Act and Rule wb-s 
thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis 
of material non public information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or 
confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the 
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic 
information? 
Strangely, however, the ban on insider trading has not been applied to members of 
Congress or their staffs. There is no rule explicitly prohibiting or allowing the 
practice, rather, the notion comes from the requirement that traders must be "in 
breach of a duty" in order to be subject to its provisions. While Congress is no 
doubt in possession of inside information as part of their position, to date no court 
or law expressly provides whether Congress therefore owes this duty. As a result, 
Congressmen have exploited this void and engaged in the practice without 
accountability. 
This presents its own set of problems remarkably similar to those sought to 
be prevented by Rules w(b)s and w(b)s-r. !fa Congressman, by virtue of his 
position on a finance committee comes into contact with legislation he knows will 
affect a certain market, his trading upon that market before the information is 
publicly disclosed, provides him with a benefit denied to other stockholders. In 
3 Securities Exchange Commission Rule lObS-1 
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practice, this is not different than the company's CEO acting in-kind. Instead, the 
"duty" that is currently ambiguous with respect to congressmen exists as part and 
parcel of their duty as elected officials to act in the best interests of their country. 
The forthwith discussion will explore both the legal and moral deficiencies of the 
practice as well as the failure of subsequent attempts at remedy to adequately 
resolve the issue. 
II. Origins 
a. Security Exchange Acts 
During the Great Depression, the Security Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 
were enacted to provide greater regulation and oversight over the financial 
markets of the United States45• The primary purpose of this legislation was to 
compel corporations selling securities to register those securities and to disclose all 
material information necessary to make an informed decision on whether to 
purchase or sell said securities. The idea was to restore and maintain confidence 
and trust in the markets and to hold accountable those corporations that 
neglected their duties to their shareholders. In 1942, under the authority granted 
to them by the 1934 Security Exchange Act, the SEC implemented Rule wb-5, 
which states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
4 Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77a 
5 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78c 
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(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any securitl. 
A facial reading of the law seems only to yield a mention of "fraud"7 but as it and 
the markets evolved, it became better known for its role in prohibiting insider 
trading. Specifically, the language proscribing trading based on non-public 
information established the rule against the practice that is familiar today. The 
language has since been modified by the landmark decision in Chiarella v. United 
States8 which narrowed the rule to forbid trading on non-public information only 
by those who owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company or the 
company itself. That case held that an employee for a printing company hired by 
the corporation seeking takeover bids did not owe a duty to the shareholders of 
that corporation even though the information he received was non-public9. 
i. Classical Insider Trading 
There are two categories of insider trading violations, each with its own 
roster of eligible offenders. The first of these classes involve what are referred to as 
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
7 1bid. 
8 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) 
9 1d. 
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"classical" insiders10• "Classical" insiders are those whose duty to the corporation 
and its shareholders stems from their position within the corporation itself. In 
most cases, "classical" traders are directors, officers and controlling shareholders of 
a corporation that use their positions to acquire and subsequently trade on non-
public informationu. Rule wb-5 and its subsequent interpretations have imposed a 
duty upon these insiders to "disclose or abstain!2" Simply, those insiders with 
access to material, non-public information must publicize that information or 
elect not to trade upon it. 
Following Chiarella, the Court wasted no time in adapting wb-5 to the 
fluidity of the market. In Dirks v. SEC3, the Court expanded the application of the 
"disclose or abstain" rule to encompass those who by virtue of even temporary 
positions became privy to non-public information. In Dirks, Dirks was an officer 
that provided investment analysis for a broker-dealer firm. He was approached by 
an insider from a mutual fund and life insurance conglomerate and notified that 
the corporation was overstating its assets'4 . Dirks was asked to investigate the 
alleged fraud and in so doing, interviewed several employees each of whom 
corroborated the insider's original allegations. Dirks subsequently offered his 
findings to the Wall Street Journal, who, fearing retribution for libel, declined to 
publish the information. Throughout, Dirks was informing his own clients to 
10 Klein, William, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Stephen Bainbridge. Business Associations. Chicago: Foundation 
Press, 2009. 
11 1bid. 
12 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) 
13 Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 525 U.S. 1070 
14 1d. 
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reconsider their investments in the corporation. As a result, the corporation's 
share value began fluctuating erratically prompting investigation from the SEC. 
Ultimately, Dirks was found to have violated Rule wb-5 by disclosing material, 
non-public information that he had acquired from his conversation from the 
corporation's insider'5. 
The case ascended to the Supreme Court, where Dirks was acquitted, but 
the boundaries for what was coined "constructive" and "tipper/tippee" liability 
were demarcated. According to Dirks, "constructive" insiders were those who, 
although not direct employees of a company, became privileged to non-public 
information through special access'6 . This could apply to employees of the 
accounting firm hired to manage the books of a corporation or of a law firm 
retained to handle a merger. Dirks held that these sorts of individuals are 
"insiders" based on their present duty to a corporation and the trust and 
confidence imbued in them by the corporation: "The classical theory applies not 
only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also 
to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become 
fiduciaries of a corporation. '7" Dirks stated that the company must actually expect 






Tipper-tippee liability is that which occurs from the leaking of non-public 
information from an insider to an outsider'9 . Dirks held that this relationship is 
reciprocal and symbiotic. To establish tipper-tippee liability, the tipper must 
breach his duty in disclosing the information and the tippee must have knowledge 
or constructive knowledge of both the duty and the breach. Additionally, the 
tippee must then transmit that information to traders or trade upon it himself and 
the tipper must receive some pecuniary benefit in the release of said information20 • 
ii. Misappropriation Theory 
The second propagated theory of insider trading is referred to as 
"misappropriation" theory. Misappropriation theory, concretized in United States 
v. O'Hagan and codified in Rule w(b)(s)-z, extends liability to those who owe 
"fiduciary-like" duties to the source of the non-public information they possess. 
The Court held that criminal liability under§ w(b) of Securities Exchange Act may 
be predicated on this theory, which permits imposition of liability on person who 
trades in securities for personal profit using material, confidential information 
without disclosing such use to source of information, in breach of fiducia1y duty to 
that source. O'Hagan involved an attorney whose firm was hired to assist with the 
tender offer and merger of a particular company. Although O'Hagan was not 
assigned to the team selected to handle the merger, he used his access to the firm-
wide database to acquire information regarding the transaction. He subsequently 
19 Klein, William, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Stephen Bainbridge.Business Associations. Chicago: Foundation 
Press, 2009. 
20 Dirks, 525 U.S. 1070 
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traded upon that information without disclosing his intent to the source and was 
convicted of insider trading21• Succinctly, O'Hagan: 
Could be found guilty of securities fraud in violation of Rule wb-5 under 
misappropriation theory; defendant had duty to his law firm, and to tender 
offeror as firm's client, to disclose use of information in connection with his 
personal purchase and sale of target corporation's stock, and failure to make 
such disclosure was "deceptive device" used in connection with purchase of 
securities within meaning of§ w(b) of Securities Exchange Act. Securities 
Exchange Act of193422 (emphasis added) 
Indeed, the precipitous issue regarding misappropriation theory is the "deceit" or 
"deceptive device" employed by which to take advantage of the information. The 
Court referred to this as "feigning fidelity" to the source of the information while 
dissembling the true purpose of profiting from the corporation's trust: "[T]he 
deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the 
source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade 
on the nonpublic information, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no§ w(b) 
violation [exists]. 23" Again, the principles of honesty and trustworthiness pervade 
the purposes of securities regulation. 
Characteristic of our laws, insider trading regulations have been trimmed 
and tailored to form nearly bright-line rules. The current state of the law then is 
characterized by a handful of salient principles: the existence of a direct or indirect 
duty between trader and corporation, the breach of that duty by trading upon or 
revealing of that information and the substance of that information being that 
which would induce a reasonable investor to trade. 




One glaring void in these laws however, is the quaint exemption for 
members of Congress. Congressman and Senators are permitted to engage in 
insider trading without any legal repercussions. The exemption is subtle and no 
casual reading of the rule or the surrounding case law would lend themselves to 
reveal the exception. Simply, the loophole exists because the law does not attach a 
duty of confidentiality- per the rule- to congressmen, towards Congress24• A 
common demonstration of the loophole is as follows: Congressman B learns that 
Chairman of the Appropriations Committee has granted a multi-million dollar 
defense contract to Company X in a Defense Appropriations bill. This is non-
public information and it will most assuredly drive Company X's stock up. 
Congressman B is free to trade on this information. This is not illegal by the 
current law25. The iniquity and injustice of this legal abyss as well as the corruption 
it has proliferated is undeniable. The proposed legislation - and its limitations -
offered to correct this abomination will be discussed shortly. 
c. Necessarily an Evil? 
Although it may appear a global truth that insider trading is an unnecessary 
evil properly proscribed by law, there are those that would dispute the vilification 
of the practice. Chief among these critics is Milton Friedman, celebrated Nobel 
laureate and professor of economics. Friedman, along with his peers, believed that 
24 
"Public Citizen on the STOCK Act." Public Citizen. http://action.citizen.org/campaign (accessed March 1, 
2012). 
25 Slaughter, Louise. "STOCK Act." Rep. Louise M. Slaughter. http://www.louise.house.gov/index.php 
(accessed March 1, 2012). 
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insider trading laws should be repealed because it actually benefits investors by 
forcing more information into the market, sooner26. Friedman also was known to 
have stated: "You want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people 
most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to 
make the public aware ofthat.27" Because the act of buying and selling was 
information itself, Friedman did not feel it was necessary to disclose a trade upon 
inside information. 
Other adherents to this idea have argued that insider trading is a victimless 
crime and thus should not be scrutinized to the degree that it is. Notably, when 
the longest prison sentence for insider trading was passed upon Raj Rajartnam last 
year, his lawyers argued "Insider trading does not cause the kinds of measurable 
losses to identifiable victims that conventional fraud causes [do].28" Following 
suit, John Carney, a Senior Economics Analyst for CNBC, proffers that because no 
victims can be identified there are no victims and because there are no victims, 
there is no crime29• More severely, advocates of the legalization philosophy believe 
that insider trading laws amount to unconstitutional censorship and are violative 
of first amendment free speech protections30• This argument rests on the 
" Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges, Oxford Press, Oxford, 2003. Chapter 29 "Insider Trading" p. 591-597 
27 1d. 
28 Lattman, Peter. 11 ln Galleon Case, Prison Term is Seen as Test. n New York Times. 
http:!/dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/in-galleon-insider-case-prison-term-is-seen-as-test//index.php 
(accessed March 1, 2012) 
29 Carney, John. "Raj's Sentence Is Too Long." CNBC. http://www.cnbc.com/id/44894853 (accessed March 
3, 2012). 
30 McGee, Robert and Walter Block. "Information, Privilege, Opportunity and Insider Trading." Northern 
Illinois University Law Review 10 (1989): 2-35. 
13 
perception that a law punishing an individual for communicating information -
regardless of its content- is tantamount to government sanctioned silencing3'. 
Attempts at justification in this manner serve only to demonstrate the 
pedantic, detached and often argumentative nature of the academic community-
"pretenders to profound knowledge, ignorant of the most useful of all sciences: the 
science of human nature.3"' In what appears to be a position that is at best 
disingenuous and at worst dangerous, these "scholars" irresponsibly disregard the 
human element that is inexorably woven into our society, our laws and our 
behaviors. Indeed, it is the human element that academics tend to discard in 
fabricating their theories. Theories that, when removed from the vacuum from 
which they were created and implemented into the ever-vacillating and frequently 
unpredictable reality of society, find little traction. 
The concept that insider trading creates no victims and should therefore be 
relieved of the legal prohibition it carries disregards several other laws that could 
also be considered "victimless" and yet remain illegal. In fact, many other crimes 
involving "possession", of firearms, narcotics and other such contraband have no 
direct or identifiable victims but are ferociously- and successfully- prosecuted 
when it is proven that such possession risks a subsequent unlawful purpose. The 
law is feckless if it waits for victims to appear before taking action. While 
possessing drugs, weapons or other dangerous substances is not inherently 
dangerous, the law responsibly removes the threat proactively. Similarly, insider 
31 1d. 
32 McCullough, John Adams at 436 
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trading is a per se deceitful behavior- it involves the intentional concealment of 
beneficial or deleterious information from the public to benefit an individual or 
group of individuals. Like the gun toting gang-member or the dope-slinging 
degenerate, the dishonest businessman's penchant for unscrupulous behavior 
portends the probability that other such frauds may occur. In reality, the insider 
trading laws are more lenient than the aforesaid possession statutes -possession of 
inside information is not illegal, only the transaction of it. 
Friedman's assessment of insider trading relies on the assumption that 
those in possession of potentially damaging information will be willing to 
disseminate that information. In so doing, Friedman ignores "the science of human 
nature" and a fundamental human flaw: greed. Triumph in business feeds on the 
concept of individual gain; it has forged the mightiest global conglomerates and 
produced some of the wealthiest people in the world. The legendary philosopher 
Ayn Rand quite clearly recognized this necessity: "Man -every man- is an end in 
itself, not the means to the ends of others. Must exist by itself and for itself, 
without sacrifice for others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of self-
interest, rational self and his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his 
lifeY" Following suit, an individual in possession of information that could benefit 
him greatly if concealed or himself and others if revealed, will naturally gravitate 
toward the former. Evidence of this preference is readily observable in capitalist 
society. 
33 Rand, Ayn. Virtue of Selfishness. 1964. 
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Power differentials, wealth inequality and laissez-faire policy are the pillars 
upon which the financial viability of a capitalist nation rests. To then claim that in 
spite of these principles, a man will still choose equality over enrichment is 
fallacious; one need look no further than our legislature to be certain. Reduced to 
its most fundamental function, the Congress of the United States exists only to 
serve and to protect the citizens of the United States. It would appear then, that if 
Friedman's theory were correct, an institution created to benefit other people 
would be the first to embrace the notion of promoting equality over self-interest, 
yet, as discussed, this is not the case34 • 
III. Exposure 
What remains, following the increasing divergence from true, American, 
republican values, is a condition where elected representatives serve to profit 
themselves and not their constituents. Insider trading -that is breaking the law-
by our own government, undermines public confidence in that government and 
poses a grave threat to the public as a result. News broadcast "6o Minutes" brought 
the issue of Congressional insider trading to sudden and tumultuous disclosure in 
November 2011 and in so doing, revealed the reprehensible and self-serving 
conduct of our representatives35. The program sought to dispense of the secrecy 
surrounding this behavior by interviewing and questioning several prominent 
34 Kroft, Steve. "Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?." CBS News. 
http://www .cbsn ews.com/8301-18560 _162 -57 323527 I congress-exempt -from-insider-trading-laws/ 
(accessed March 4, 2012). 
35 ld. 
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members of the House of Representatives including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
and current Speaker John Boehner36. Their attempts were largely in vain and when 
finally cornered at their weekly press conference, both Speakers provided 
defensive, evasive and aggressive responses to questions pertaining to their 
conduct37• 
Speaker Boehner was asked generally if he felt it was appropriate that 
members of congress be allowed to trade on non-public information to which he 
answered that there "were many rules governing the ethics of house members and 
that [he] believed members obeyed them38". Speaker Pelosi was questioned 
directly on her trade of Initial Public Offering stock from VISA during a time when 
new credit card regulations were pending in the House of Representatives. Asked if 
she felt if there was a conflict with that purchase, she replied that she "didn't see a 
point to what [6o Minutes Reporter Steve Kroft] was saying" and asked him "what 
[his] point was.39" That our elected leadership does not recognize that their 
behavior is unethical is far more dangerous than the conscious schemers that 
simply disregard the fact. Mere weeks following this report, President Obama 






for congressmen and I will sign it.40" The point having been made, it seems 
congress was finally cornered. 
a. The STOCK Act 
The "Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge" Act, or STOCK Act, was 
originally introduced in the House of Representatives on Mar. 28, 2006 by Brian 
Baird (D-WA) and Louise Slaughter (D-NY) where it died in committee. It was 
reintroduced the following year, as well as in 2009, where it also died in 
committee4'. In December 2011, following the 6o Minutes piece, the Act was 
revived only to be quashed by congressional bureaucracy: "House Majority Leader 
Eric Cantor (R-VA) indefinitely postponed the ... session on Dec. 7, 2011, stating 
that 'a large group of bipartisan members of the committee felt the legislation was 
flawed and being recklessly moved solely in response to media pressure. Members 
of both sides of the aisle wanted more time to gather information and develop 
appropriate alternativesY"' Only after the President's speech in January 2012 did 
Congress get around to passing a preliminary version of the bill, somehow 
acquiring 96 votes in the Senate and an overwhelming 417 votes in the House43. 
While it appears that issue has finally been resolved, a closer look at the 
STOCK Act reveals just how little corrective good it does and how little would 
40 
"Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address." White House. 
http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address 
(accessed March 7, 2012). 
41 
"What is the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge {STOCK) Act?." ProCon. 
http://insidertrading.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceiD=004520 (accessed March 7, 2012). 
42 1d. 
43 
"STOCK Act Votes." Politico. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72670.html (accessed March 
7, 2012). 
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actually be changed. Respected Professor and author Stephen Bainbridge 
expounds on the limitations and recognizes the futility of this law as a mechanism 
for reform44. The misleading clause within the Act states that it prevents: 
[A]ny person from buying or selling the securities or security-based 
swaps of any issuer while such person is in possession of material 
nonpublic information relating to any pending or prospective 
legislative action relating to such issuer, if--
(A) such information was obtained by reason of such person 
being a Member or employee of Congress; or 
(B) such information was obtained from a Member or 
employee of Congress, and such person knows that the information 
was so obtained.45 
This means that any member or employee of Congress cannot trade on material, 
non-public information if it is related to "pending or prospective legislative action" 
and tippees are banned from trading on the information if they know the source is 
a member or employee of Congress. 
Professor Bainbridge notes the ambiguity of "pending or prospective 
legislative action" as well as its narrow constraints46. Bainbridge describes 
numerous hypothetical situations that would be simple to devise to effectively 
circumvent the law: 
• After Congress defeats proposed legislation that would have sharply 
increased Acme's costs of doing business, Acme's CEO gives a key 
Congressman a hot tip on Acme stock as a pay off. There was a legislative 
action, but it was in the past and, accordingly, is neither pending nor 
prospective. 
44 Bainbridge, Stephen. "I Have Seen the STOCK Act and I Am Unimpressed." Stephen Bainbridge. 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/11/i-have-seen-the-stock-act-and-i-




• A Member of Congress learned from a Cabinet member that a government 
agency was about to enter a large procurement contract. There is no 
"pending or prospective" legislative action, but there is valuable material 
nonpublic information on which the member could trade. 
• The CEO of Acme is an avid hunter. Congress is considering legislative 
action that would ban hunting of the CEO's favorite game animal. The CEO 
of Acme gives a key Congressman a hot tip on Acme stock as a bribe to 
oppose the hunting law. This is perhaps the most egregious form of 
Congressional insider trading, yet there is no "pending or prospective 
legislative action relating to such issuer." To the contrary, the legislative 
action in question is entirely unrelated to the issuer. 
• During a confidential committee investigation, a Member of Congress 
learns that Acme is about to announce a major new discovery. The member 
infers that Ajax-Acme's major competitor-will take a serious hit. The 
member shorts Ajax stock. Technically, the member has not traded in the 
stock of"such issuer."47 
None of these situations present any difficulty or substantial obstacle to impede 
members of Congress from carrying on "business as usual". Another deceptive 
component of the Act is the reporting requirement. 
Within 90 days after the purchase, sale, or exchange of any stocks, 
bonds, commodities futures, or other forms of securities that are 
otherwise required to be reported under this Act and the transaction 
of which involves at least $1,ooo by any Member of Congress or 
officer or employee of the legislative branch required to so file, that 
Member, officer, or employee shall file a report of that transaction 
with the Clerk of the House of Representatives in the case of a 
Representative in Congress, a Delegate to Congress, or the Resident 
Commissioner from Puerto Rico, or with the Secretary of the Senate 
in the case of a Senator.48 
Essentially, Congressmen and Senators have 90 days to report their dealings if 




and Exchange Act requires corporate insiders to report within only 2 days49. 
Congressman Sean Duffy (R-Wisc) even condemns the "loop hole" stating: "For 
example, under the STOCK Act, a Member of Congress could trade $5o,ooo in one 
day in so trades at $950 a trade and never trigger the reporting requirement. 50" 
Subtly and again, Congress attempts to elevate themselves above the standards set 
for average citizens, while their conduct lands them decidedly beneath them. 
Summarily, the STOCK Act is an insultingly clumsy attempt at remediation for a 
practice so markedly distasteful. 
b. Exceptionalism 
Despite the uncounted legal potholes the STOCK Act leaves untended, it is 
still necessary to demonstrate why the passage of this law continues a tradition of 
congressional exceptionalism. The simplest way to discuss this would be to 
compare the STOCK Act to those laws preventing insider trading to the rest of the 
population. That law, SEC Rule w(b)5-1 states: 
The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section w(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-s 
thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis 
of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or 
confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the 
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic 
information.5l 
49 15 U.S. C. §78c, Section 16 
50 Duffy, Sean. "Congress Should Serve the People, Not Their Portfolios." Sean Duffy. 
http://duffy.house.gov/columns/duffy-op-ed-restrict-act (accessed March 10, 2012). 
51 Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b5-1 
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This law unambiguously prohibits the practice of insider trading to anyone with a 
duty to the shareholders of that corporation. w(b)5-1 does in one paragraph what 
the STOCK Act cannot in several. Rather than merely appending the existing rule 
to include a specific ban on congressmen and their staffs, the STOCK Act was, 
through painful specificity, sure to avoid the issue entirely. However there have 
been alternatives proposed and while they are not likely to ever be passed, they are 
worth extrapolation. 
c. A Stronger Alternative: the RESTRICT Act 
Congressman Sean Duffy (R-Wise) introduced the Restoring Ethical 
Standards, Transparency and Responsibility in Congressional Trading Act, or, 
RESTRICT Ace. The RESTRICT Act, according to Congressman Duffy, removes 
any doubt over the obligations members of Congress have regarding material, non-
public information. Among the provisions of the RESTRICT Act is the directive 
that all members of Congress and their senior staff be required to either 1) move all 
of their assets into a blind trust, or 2) disclose any transaction within 3 days. 53 
Although the RESTRICT Act would effectively eliminate insider trading by 
members of Congress, it has received little notoriety or attention from 
Congressman Duffy's colleagues. 
c. The Empire Strikes Back545556• 
52 1d. 
53 1d. 
54 The single most destructive issue surrounding this legislative miscarriage is the inability- and 
disincentive- for law enforcement and its affiliates to prosecute Congressmen and Senators for such 
behavior even if it were unambiguously illegal. The SEC is funded by Congress. While, it may not seem 
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IV. Conclusion 
The dangers of allowing the practice of insider trading by members of 
Congress to continue are perilous. The practice undermines the integrity of the 
market and worse, the confidence the people of the United States have in their 
government. If! eft untended, it would lead to the irrevocable estrangement of the 
government to their people and the system would be broken. The STOCK Act will 
fail to redress this harm as the law, as written, does nothing to alter the course, but 
provides an ineffective detour on the road to continuing the practice. 
plausible that Congress would retaliate against its own agencies for doing their job, it has. In 2006, the 
William Jefferson, when he was Representative William Jefferson of the 2nd District of Louisiana was 
indicted on Federal bribery charges after $90,000 in cash was found in his freezer. 56 The FBI executed a 
properly constituted search warrant on Jefferson's congressional office in the hunt for additional 
incriminating evidence. In response, the House of Representatives exploded, claiming it was an 
unconstitutional violation of the "speech and debate" clause55 and threatened to cut the budget of the 
Department of Justice". The Congress of the United States threatened financial retribution against an 
agency designed to protect the American citizenry from of all kinds and of the direst importance. 
55 The Speech and Debate Clause refers to Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Federal Constitution which 
states that members of both houses "shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, 
be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going 
to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any 
other Place." 
56 
"Threats Followed FBI Search of Congressman's Office." Associated Press. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,197293,00.html (accessed February 12, 2012). 
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V. Moral Underpinnings 
a. Moral Theory of John Finnis 
While a moral indictment of the conduct at issue has been made, it is 
important to discuss the alignment of that indictment with certain moral 
principles; specifically, a discussion of the moral philosophy of Natural Law 
theorist John Finnis. In his "Natural Law & Natural Rights" Finnis enumerates 
seven basic goods - or as Finnish himself describes as "irreducibly" fundamental 
aspects of human well-being57. Finnis lists life, knowledge, play, aesthetic 
experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion as the primal "goods" 
one should seek to participate in and embrace throughout one's life. In the pursuit 
of these goods, Finnis expounds on the notion of "practical reasonableness", or, the 
effective and proper manner by which these basic goods be enjoyed. 
Life, Finnis says, refers to a vast array of components that comprise its 
common understanding. Bodily health, freedom from pain and disease and the 
preservation of one's own life as well as that of others. Finnis cites several 
institutions, networks and systems that exist solely to enrich and preserve this 
basic value. Additionally, Finnis partially incorporates the process of procreation 
and child rearing as part and parcel of this basic good. Knowledge, the pursuit of 
which for its own sake, is another fundamental good that one should seek to 
acquire. Knowledge, not merely as a vehicle to pursue other goods, but to fulfill 
the basic inclination to desire and embrace the truth. According to Finnis, the 
57 Finnis, John. Natural Law & Natural Rights. New York: 1980. 
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natural proclivity of humans to exhibit curiosity is demonstrative of their desire to 
understand the objective truth of a situation and to avoid ignorance and 
unknowing. Finnis describes "play" as engaging in an activity for no purpose other 
than to engage in the activity. This absence of any ulterior or serious motivation is 
evidence that "play" exists, if only in the negative. Its value unto itself, Finnis says, 
is proven by the various global institutions that exist only to promote participation 
in this basic good. Finnis next discusses the concept of "aesthetic experience", or 
simply, "beauty". While beauty is often a part of play, Finnis distinguishes the two 
by noting participation in "beauty" requires no action on the part of the 
participant, rather merely an inward appreciation of that which is outside of the 
individual. Finnis also includes the notion that beauty can - to a greater extent -
be participated in by creating some significant work of one's design that can be 
appreciated.58 
The fifth basic good Finnis describes as sociability or friendship. This good 
can be embraced along a spectrum of intensity, ranging from mere harmony with 
other persons to an intimate and full friendship. Friendship, Finnis points out, is a 
relationship between individuals wherein one party acts out of the interest of the 
other and to the betterment of the other's well-being. However, this is only one 
relationship possible in exploring the good of sociability as a whole59. The next 
good, which shares its name with the desirable method of achieving the other 
goods: "practical reasonableness", as Finnis puts it, is the process of obtaining the 
58 ld. at 87 
59 ld. at 88 
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other goods by effective, efficient, and productive ways, which he explains in detail 
and will be discussed shortly. The seventh and last fundamental good Finnis offers 
is religion. Religion is not, Finnis makes clear, an acceptance or belief in the Divine 
but rather a thoughtful and thorough contemplation of the origin of human 
reason, life, and the cosmos. Doing so, Finnis suggests, allows one to better 
understand his own role among fellow humans and his own purpose.60 
c. Requirements of Practical Reasonableness 
The pursuit of these goods requires an assessment process Finn is coins as 
"practical reasonableness." Practical reasonableness provides a checklist, as it were, 
to consult when attempting to participate in each of the enumerated goods. Finnis 
provides eight criteria worthy of consideration that if followed, allows not only for 
the participation of the fundamental goods, but under circumstances beneficial for 
the interested parties. 
Finnis begins by asserting that man's energies should be devoted to a 
singular "rational life plan"6'. This, according to Finnis, is more than merely 
blueprints, but a concordant, harmonious relationship among every decision an 
individual makes, in pursuit of an ultimate objective or achievement. That is to 
say, if one wishes to achieve a maximal level of physical fitness, one would not 
engage in activities contra to that goal; smoking, drinking, drug abuse, etc. Each 
rung of the ladder must be ascending, or at least moving laterally. Finnis expands 
60 ld. at 89 
61 ld. at 103 
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this notion in declaiming that one should view his or her life from the perspective 
of that life's terminus. Every decision must be a rational part of a larger, life-long 
continuum that should be assessed as if one were living their final days. 
Finnis next contends that no value should be arbitrarily preferred over 
another62 . He stresses that preference is permissible and indeed favorable, but that 
it must have considered "one's capacities, circumstances ... and one's tastes." 
Simply, Finnis believes one must have some "good reason" to subordinate one 
value to another. One cannot, Finnis warns, prefer one good over another because 
one devalues another good or overvalues an "instrumental" good, such as wealth or 
opportunity. One can reasonably choose to not pursue knowledge, but one cannot 
reasonably deny the importance of knowledge nor the desirability of avoiding 
ignorance. Following suit, Finnis then applies the same principles to the 
preference of persons. Finnis states that one cannot arbitrarily select to protect the 
interests of one person over another, but must have some rational reason in so 
doing. This is not a difficult standard to satisfY; it is reasonable to choose one's 
child over an unfamiliar child, one's friend over one's enemy and one's family over 
another's. Finnis also allows what he calls a "reasonable scope for self-preference", 
or the permissibility in certain situations to select one's own interests over other's. 
Detachment and commitment6', Finnis declares, are also necessa1y to 
appropriately assess the pursuit of fundamental goods. Finnis remarks that one 
62 ld. at 105 
63 ld. at 109 
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should not be so invested into any project that the failure of which would result in 
devastation to one's overall life plan. In this, Finnis argues that one must be 
sufficiently detached from a situation or task as to allow that person to handle 
disappointment reasonably and to move on from the letdown. Conversely but 
concordantly, Finnis stresses the need for commitment. Commitment, according 
to Finnis, is the necessary effort required to appropriately engage a task and that if 
one decides to apply himself, he must not surrender the project lightly. After all, 
Finnis reminds, the pursuit of any of the basic goods requires some commitment; 
to too easily give up would be tantamount to absence from any of the fundamental 
goods. 
The sixth requirement Finn is describes as "efficiency within reason"64. This 
requires that the pursuit of any good must be clone in a manner properly suited for 
the situation. One must not "waste one's opportunities by using inefficient 
methods. One's actions should be judged by their effectiveness ... their fitness of 
purpose ... utility [and] consequences." Simply put, this requirement asks that one 
should attempt to achieve the most good with the least amount of effort. Given the 
option of relieving pain or relieving pain and healing Finnis postulates, the latter is 
clearly preferable. This requirement demands more than mere "calculus" as Finnis 
calls it, or simple "cost-benefit" analyses. This is largely clue to the incongruence 
between (and adherence to) a system of weighing goods and weighing moral 
64 ld. at 111 
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decisions. This manifestation of consequentialism is arbitrary and unacceptable 
according to Finnis. 
Next, Finnis stresses the need for respecting every basic value in every act65. 
This requirement can be satisfied by acting in a manner that serves no purpose 
other than to damage the pursuit of a basic value. The only way that such action 
can be justifiable is if there is some consequence, the good of which outweighs the 
damage inflicted. This is obtainable, Finnis says, simply by being deliberative in 
one's actions. One that acts deliberately acts only to protect or preserve some basic 
good, even if that good is selfish or facially malicious. Finnis' final two 
requirements to ensure practical pursuit of the basic goods are those which 
consider the common good, and those which reflect the inclinations of one's 
conscience. Simply, maintaining harmony with one's conscience requires only that 
if one "feels" some task or action is wrong, one should not continue. Considering 
such feelings are the result of time and experience, it is not unreasonable to 
recognize dissonance as a warning to desist. 
b. Synergy 
Having briefly introduced the moral standard by which the aforementioned 
issue will be measured, it is appropriate therefore to observe how the action of 
insider trading by members of congress aligns with or violates the applicable 
theory. Concurrently, the discussion will analyze the STOCK Act through the same 
sieve and determine the effectiveness of that law. From the outset, the conduct-
65 I d. at 118 
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and the attempt at remedy- is condemnable under any theory of morality, yet this 
analysis will strive to demonstrate its degeneracy specifically through the lens of 
Finnis. 
i. Knowledge 
The basic good most heavily impacted by the controversial law is 
unquestionably "knowledge". While the law deals facially with information, 
knowledge and the use of that knowledge, the analysis requires a far more involved 
inquiry. The good of knowledge in the Finnisian sense is the pursuit of knowledge 
simply for the sake of having it and to promote the avoidance of ignorance. To 
examine how "knowledge" is implicated by this law, "knowledge" must be 
bifurcated. The first part concerns the actual information that is stigmatized by the 
statute. As mentioned, "insider" information is that which comes from the source 
of the information but is not disseminated publicly. The law allows for certain 
individuals to possess and take advantage of this information while withholding 
from others the same privilege. The "information" itself would be used to make 
lucrative investments and thus enhance one's well-being. 
However, a more profound understanding of"knowledge" exposes a 
grimmer and indeed more crucial revelation: the average citizen is not aware that 
their representatives are engaging in this activity. Having knowledge of this 
controversial practice would alter the perspective of many Americans in their 
perception of their government. "Knowledge for knowledge's sake", as Finnis says, 
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would require that the citizenry be aware of the actions of their government, 
especially when the concealment of those actions impairs a citizen's right to make 
accurate and informed decisions about their governance. The current status of the 
law- along with the impotent attempt to cure it via the STOCK Act- do little in 
the way of properly informing the citizen and allowing them to make well-founded 
and rational decisions. 
The STOCK Act proves even more injurious to this fundamental good than 
even the practice of insider trading itself. The act, as discussed earlier, does not 
ban the practice, rather it serves only to confound the average citizen into 
believing that it does. The language of the act requires such precise parsing to 
understand its deceptive nature that it further prevents the average citizen from 
understanding the actions of his representatives. This again is a two-fold attack on 
this basic value. 
The first attack is the unabashed attempt of congress to write a law so 
obtuse and confusing in language, that the average citizen is incapacitated to 
become as well-informed as he has a right to be. Second, is the use of the law to 
continue a practice that unquestionably clouds the conduct of congressmen and 
creates a fog between the representative and his constituent that cannot be 
penetrated. As mentioned above, the codification of this Act creates a tangible bar 
on actions brought in protest. With the support oflegislative act, congress can sit 
comfortably behind the act and claim that it was the result of duly debated and 
properly constituted republican procedure. This indisputably restricts the ability of 
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citizens to make informed decisions about their representatives and constrains 
their right to a transparent and honest government. 
An analysis oflife, play, aesthetic experience, and religion would be too 
attenuated to be significant for this discussion. 
ii. Friendship 
Finnis' definition of "friendship" is a relationship where one individual puts 
the interests of his friend above his own. Under such a definition, the STOCK Act 
and insider trading cannot be sustained. The analysis of this basic good should be 
understood from the perspective of the definition and not the word itself. When 
taken in the context of a relationship by which one party seeks to enrich the other, 
even at the expense of itself, the intended function of Congress is revealed. The 
only role of a republican government is to provide the means by which those they 
represent can best pursue a fulfilling life. Plainly, the acceptance of an elected post 
carries with it as much power as it does responsibility. By choosing to represent 
other people, one's own interest must be forfeited or at the least, subordinated to 
those he now represents. 
Therefore, the behavior of Congress in the instant appraisal unabashedly 
attacks this fundamental value. By taking advantage of their position to enrich 
themselves- and at the expense of the market and ordinary investors- they act in 
diametric opposition to the tenets of friendship. Further, the passage of the 
STOCK Act further emphasizes Congress' disregard for the will of their 
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constituents. If it were Congress' intent to produce an outright ban on insider 
trading by themselves and their staffs, the language of the law would not be too 
different from w(b)s-r. Indeed, if their aim was to revive confidence in the 
integrity of the institution, the law would be still more plain spoken. 
Satisfying Finnis' idea of friendship would require Congress only to do what 
they were intended: to abase themselves at the will of the people they claim to 
represent and to act only to benefit those individuals who trust in them to speak 
for them. If Congress feels this burden is too great, they ought resign the office and 
allow those willing to take their place. 
iii. Requirements of Practical Reasonableness: Coherent Life Plan 
An attempt to justify these shortcomings by declaring them the result of a 
practically reasonable rationing process will find little refuge. Finnis demands that 
all goods be pursued as part of a "coherent life plan". This can apply to individuals 
and institutions alike. An institution founded on the republican ideals of 
transparency and fervent representation would not practice conduct that is 
inherently furtive. It undermines the principles upon which the institution was 
founded and more dangerously jeopardizes the authority that institution can claim 
to possess. It follows that a system that as a matter of survival requires honest 
communication between its members and its constituents would be incentivized 
to sustain that level of veracity if only to maintain their own positions. It is in this 
manner that the practice in dispute is wholly contrary to any rational life plan. 
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The STOCK Act does little to remedy this. As discussed earlier, that act 
exists only to obfuscate the practice and not to abolish it. In the pursuit of a 
sustainable, transparent government, lawmakers cannot rationalize such an 
insultingly lame attempt at a cure. The survival of a government depends on trust. 
Citizens trust their representatives to create laws that not only benefit them, but 
are also reasonably easy to understand. The STOCK Act violates this tenant twice. 
At first glance, it buries the continuation of the practice underneath a 
torrent oflegal terminology and exceptions, which, to the average citizen, may 
appear to restrict the action but conceals its more nefarious goal. Its second injury 
to basic republicanism is outright lie told to citizens. This act was advertised as the 
death knell to the practice of insider trading by congressmen and their staffs. In 
practice, it achieves the opposite. The proposal and approval of the STOCK Act is 
arguably worse than it never having existed; it tells the citizen a story and prevents 
that citizen from checking for himself by creating a labyrinth oflegalese 
penetrated only by those with legal training. 
iv. No Arbitrary Preferences 
Finnis requires that no decision be made with an arbitrary preference for 
values or persons. This means that a preferential choice be made only when 
supported by some reasonable foundation. In fact, Finnis notes that a decision is 
also considered "arbitrary" if the pursuit of a given good is achieved by devaluing 
another fundamental good. In that context, the decision to both engage in an 
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activity prohibited to the citizenry-at-large and to intentionally avoid holding 
oneself accountable is arbitrary and iniquitous. While one can only speculate as to 
Congress' rationale in behaving as they do, that speculation is strongly supported 
by contextual evidence lending itselfto demonstrate Congress' overwhelming 
preference for themselves. While Finnis allows a "reasonable scope of self-
preference", no such defense can be properly asserted. Congress exists only to 
serve the people who placed them in office. This narrows a congressman's scope 
for self-preference so greatly as to extinguish it entirely. Every action taken by a 
"representative", at least while in that capacity, must be favorable only to those he 
represents - even at his own expense. 
The STOCK Act is extremely arbitrary. It favors Congress for no other 
reason that they are Congress. Only congress can pass the laws. Therefore, 
congress has the power to pass laws that benefit themselves. This is an example of 
just that. The passage of the STOCK Act codifies that means by which 
congressmen can continue to insider trade while pretending that it serves to 
abolish the practice altogether. The whole process is saturated with inequitable 
self-preference. This law considers the interests of none but the congress 
themselves and compounds the insult by pawning it off as the death knell of the 
practice. This analysis would be of greater depth if there was but the slightest 
ambiguity in the design and aim of the law. However, this law can be understood 
only as the product of a self-interested, self-absorbed body that abuses its popular 
authority to serve itself. 
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v. Detachment and Commitment 
Finnis requires also that decisions be made with appropriate degrees of 
detachment and commitment. In trading on inside information and using their 
power to preserve such a practice, congress acts in opposition to these 
requirements of practical reasonableness. Detachment, insofar as governing is 
concerned, requires that a representative act in the objectively best interests of his 
constituents. Further, his decisions must also be tempered with his own 
conscience. When coupled, these influences allows a representative to be the voice 
of his electorate. Even if his attempts fail before his peers in congress, he is not 
personally devastated nor does he feel his purpose has been stricken because he 
has vocalized his constituents' concerns and they were outnumbered by the 
concerns of other representatives. Moreover, this "ideal" representative would have 
satisfactorily "committed" himself in the effort by voicing his district or state's 
concerns as far as his role allowed him and would not have abandoned his task 
lightly. 
The current state of politicking survives no such analysis. Presently, 
members of congress are wholly invested in their positions because their positions 
are a source of obscene wealth. They become servants to the prospect of fortune 
and use their power to benefit themselves without regard for their constituents. 
Because they rarely - if ever -act solely for the interests of their citizens, without 
the ability to enrich themselves, their position becomes empty and their incentive 
to perform, neutered. With respect to detachment, the modern politician falls 
36 
painfully short of satisfaction. The position which they have the privilege of 
holding is by its nature detached from all personal endeavors; their purpose in 
office is to speak for their people and not for themselves. Failure must also be 
allocated concerning "commitment". While congress no doubt pursues these 
efforts with aplomb, the pursuits themselves are perfidious. Ipso facto, the pursuit 
of an action that violates the purpose of the actor cannot serve to satisfy this 
requirement for practical reasonableness. The energy devoted to self-preservation 
and enrichment should be directed towards serving the public and not themselves. 
On that same note, the energy spent in developing a deceitful and 
duplicitous law such as the STOCK Act represents a greedy attachment to power 
and an obsessive desire to augment it. The representative should be without 
interests outside of those of his constituents. His is merely a conduit that channels 
the needs of his citizens and champions their interests for the sake of their 
interests only. This act however, demonstrates the effect of representatives who 
serve themselves, for the sake of themselves, and have long since forgotten his 
purpose as a representative. Rather than proposing laws in the name of the people, 
laws like this represent a generation oflawmakers that propose laws that benefit 
their constituents incidentally, while the whole of their concern is concentrated on 
lengthening their tenure in congress while eliciting some other benefit: i.e., 
individual accession to wealth. 
This is proven by the very language of the STOCK Act. It is so confusing 
that it forces the individual to rely on the goodwill of his representative. This 
37 
invests so much power in the representative that he becomes frighteningly 
attached to the position. Evidence of this is the failure of congress to pass any bill 
that so much as mentions "term limits". This ravenous attachment to position and 
power undeniably fails Finnis' fifth criterion. 
vi. Efficiency 
The last remark overlaps with the sixth requirement of practical 
reasonableness demanding the efficient appropriation of effort in the pursuit of 
goods. While this requirement cannot truly be employed in the instant case, it is 
important to note that the effective utilization of skill and energy is recognized by 
Finnis as necessary to bring about the fundamental goods. The sixth requirement 
assumes that a basic value is being pursued, but the manner which it is procured is 
questionable. Concerning the issue in controversy, no good is being pursued. In 
fact, the inefficient legislative process is being employed to facilitate the passage of 
legislation that damages the values of many others. 
Concordantly, the STOCK Act only serves to cloud the law on insider 
trading. It creates an ocean of ambiguities that one way or another will have to be 
sorted out by the courts. This creates a monumental systemic inefficiency. If 
congress' intent was to procure an outright ban on insider trading, the language of 
the bill would have reflected that. 
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vii. No Direct Attack on Other Goods 
Recognizing this possibility, Finnis also prohibits any action that serves 
only to damage the realization of a value or good by others. This seventh 
requirement allows for the indirect and incidental damage of goods if the 
expectation and purpose of the action was to promote the realization of another 
value or good. This is quite different than "weighing" the pros and cons of an 
action which Finnis dismisses as nonsensical and impracticable. Fortunately (or 
unfortunately), the analysis of this requirement of practical reasonableness is 
unequivocal. Congress has made it so by engaging in an action that directly 
impairs the realization of several goods while failing to even offer a good that 
might be promoted. As mentioned earlier, the engaging in of insider trading and 
the subsequent failure to make an honest attempt to denounce and eliminate the 
practice inhibits the citizen's ability to trust and support their government, to 
enjoy unadulterated honesty from their representatives and serves to undermine 
the very authority that government claims to possess. 
The STOCK Act is a direct attack on all of the preceding and pertinent 
goods as it serves to exacerbate the problem rather than provide a remedy. For all 
of the above reasons, it clouds the language of the law and the restrictions, it 
thickens the barrier between constituent and representative and creates an overall 
inhibition on the abilities of citizens to pursue goods and values to their rightfully 
maximum potential. 
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viii. Good of the Community 
Finnis' eighth requirement is that the common good of one's community be 
better served. In a perverse way, congress is actually acting to benefit the 
community of congressmen. In turn, however, the larger community, i.e., the 
population of the United States is injured. Therefore, these actions cannot 
plausibly be seen to serve the common good. The ninth and final requirement of 
practical reasonableness asks that an actor act in congruence with his conscience. 
Invoking the Thomist perspective, Finnis states simply that if an act "does not feel 
right", then the act should be abandoned. Indeed, if one chooses to do what one 
feels is unreasonable, than the act is per se unreasonable. Similarly, no objective 
reasoning could justifY a group of individuals trusted with the welfare of a larger 
group of people using their positions to benefit themselves without consideration 
for that larger group. 
ix. Promotion of Justice 
Finnis recognizes the importance of justice as a prevailing and pervasive 
component that must be considered in the analysis of a given action. Given the 
breadth of term like "justice", Finnis splits his analysis into two manifestations: 
distributive and commutative66. 
66 ld. at 164 
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a. Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice, according to Finnis, is the notion that resources 
common to a community are allocated in a manner befitting the most productive 
use of the resources67• As it pertains to the instant assessment, this would 
implicate the distribution of wealth from rich to poor so that the poor could at 
least provide for the basic values in their own lives. This, Finnis asserts, is the most 
productive use of surplus wealth rather than lying stagnant in the vaults of the 
rich. Six criteria exist to measure an action against in determining its satisfaction 
of distributive justice. 
Primacy is given to "need". Need, per Finnis, is a fundamental component of 
the common good68. Axiomatically, resources ought to be distributed with due 
consideration given to those who would benefit most from its physical receipt. 
While this can be corrupted, by those who become needy by their own devices or 
by those simply unwilling to exert in their own benefit, this criterion remains 
dominant. 
Akin to "need" is the element of"function". Function, according to Finnis, is 
the "need" of certain roles within a community- whereas "need" considers who by 
necessity is want of a resource, "function" considers who within the community 
could best use the resource69. Capacity, Finnis says, is that which considers the 
67 ld. at 166 
68 1d. at 174 
69 1d.at175 
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propensity for individual achievement in the distribution of a resource70. Examples 
include "flutes to flute players" and that higher education, if provided for, should 
be granted to those most able to use it. Succinctly, a round peg in a round hole. 
Meritorious deserts follow fourth. As the name suggests, those who have 
contributed much and through self-sacrifice have benefitted the community 
should be duly considered7'. Conversely, the chance that avoidable risk was created 
or foreseen should be considered fifth72• The sixth and final criterion asks that each 
of the preceding criteria be considered in the context of each individuals 
responsibilities within his community; from each to his ability, to each from his 
merit, as it were73• 
b. Commutative Justice 
The other hemisphere of Finnis' construal of justice is what he refers to as 
"commutative justice"74. Commutative justice is that which applies to 
interpersonal relationships. Again Finnis divides this analysis into five criteria. 
First, Finnis simply requires that the relationship be between certain 
individuals. He invokes a basic example: "A's failure, without good reason, to 
perform a on a contract with B is commutatively unjust,"75 as a result, A would pay 





74 ld. at 177 
75 ld. at 183 
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another and must fulfill that obligation lest he be in breach of commutatively just 
behavior. 
Second, Finnis establishes a duty of care. Similar to that of tort law, it is a 
requirement to act responsibly towards others they directly interact with; the 
avoidance of negligent or reckless activity76. 
Third, Finnis expands the duty of care to demand that one act responsibly 
towards those he may not directly interact with, but whose participation in the 
same system implicates that individual's interests77• A ripe example of this would 
be one member of a gym letting his friends in the back door and not requiring 
them to pay membership. The gym would suffer and eventually shut down, 
depriving others of the benefit that it provided. 
Finnis then explains the duty of the citizen to obey and adhere to the laws 
of a government, even if those laws may appear unjust78• Lastly, Finnis requires in 
the inverse, that those in power treat respectfully those subject to their authority 
and controF9 • 
a. Application of Distributive Justice 
Both the practice of insider trading and the insipid law offered in remedy 
cruelly violate the principles of distributive justice. It should be noted that the 





interests of distributive justice and the common good are closely aligned as they 
pertain to this issue and therefore that concept will be discussed as well. 
i. Need 
It is no coincidence that those in power are also wealthy. The practice ofw 
insider trading by members of congress permits those individuals to augment their 
wealth by virtue of their power. This cycle serves to exclude those in more 
desperate and humble need of such excess. Any extant poverty in a nation where 
the lawmakers are privy to wealth beyond measure is the unacceptable result of an 
unacceptable practice. The allowance of insider trading blinds those responsible 
for the enrichment of society with visions of their own affluence at the expense of 
those truly in need. 
ii. Function 
As per function, the distribution of excess market wealth to those interested 
only in its acquisition cannot meet this requirement. For function to be properly 
met, the monies available from such surreptitious exchanges would be reinserted 
into charitable organizations or at the very least, the federal treasury. This would 
ensure that those best situated to use the money most effectively would be in 
possession of it. 
Instead, as with "need", the money is hoarded by a handful of individuals 
who are in no position to productively use their wealth beyond gratifYing their 
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own interests. The STOCK Act merely codifies the practice and demonstrates the 
unwillingness of the legislature to engage in distributively just behavior. 
iii. Capacity 
Finnis defines "common" resources as those which no man has an inherent 
claim of right. The air, the sea, that which lies in the sea, etc. As opposed to private 
property, that carries a self-explanatory interpretation. Money, however, is a 
bizarre intermediary. It is required to obtain almost every other resource but is 
itself, useless. Because it is tied so closely to human affairs and is as readily 
available to the privileged as any other resource would be, it can arguably be 
considered common. 
Following suit, Finnis' requirement of"capacity" would demand that this 
resource be distributed to those most capable of benefitting from it. It can be 
stated with some certainty that a body of individuals charged with running the 
government - not funding it- would not benefit more from excess wealth then the 
besieged farmer or the single mother. The farmer could use the money to repair 
and restore his farm (and by extension helping all those who purchase from the 
farmer) and the single mother could apply it towards enriching the lives of her 
children. These are but two of many examples of individuals better suited to 
benefit than our legislators. 
iv. Deserts and Contributions 
45 
From the outset this requirement cannot be met. Congressmen have 
neither contributed to the production of dividends nor merited the receipt of 
them. They "deserve" as much wealth from successful (and rigged) stock trades as 
a gambler "deserves" his winnings. Yea, a gambler at least risks losing and is not 
privy to what cards the other players are holding. 
v. Acceptance of Avoidable Risk 
While congressmen who trade on inside information might not create the 
risks nor are subject to them, when risks do exist, one never hears them warning 
other shareholders (see, citizens) about the potential for loss. So while they have 
little part in the failures of the companies which they invest, they have equally 
small part in alerting those they claim to represent and protect of those risks. 
vi. Relativity to Responsibility 
By assuming rulership over their people, congressmen must be held to the 
highest standard in behaving justly. Yet, even if they were held to the lowest 
standard, their conduct could not plausibly satisfy any of the requirements of 
distributive justice. 
b. Application of Commutative Justice 
Both the practice of insider trading by members of congress and the STOCK 
Act implicate Finnis' fifth factor of commutative justice. Seeing as the subject of 
the practice and the creators of the law are members of government, congressmen 
owe a duty of commutative justice to all of those beholden to their authority. In 
46 
that manner, Congress and their law fail utterly. Congress' fundamental purpose is 
the creation oflaws that benefit the common good. Even the most narrow 
application of this power could not find Congress' present actions agreeable. This 
practice and this law were created unabashedly and specifically for the purpose of 
immunizing Congress from punishment for behavior prohibited to the rest of the 
country. Their dealings with each other are held in priority over those with their 
constituents -whom they are lawfully obligated to represent. It is inconceivable 
that such avarice could be justified by any power of Congress. 
xi. Confluence and Conclusion 
Finnis does not believe that the satisfaction his requirements of practical 
reasonableness add up to a "moral" action. Instead, Finnis asks that a decision be 
the result of a natural and harmonious combination of each of the requirements; 
no one requirement is dispositive of morality or immorality. Further, while every 
requirement does not necessarily fit into every moral decision, every moral 
decision reflects some conjugation of those requirements. 
Ultimately, the practice of insider trading and the creation of a law that 
does little more than to deceive the average citizen into believing it a remedy 
cannot be sustained under a moral analysis. This objectively and indisputably 
selfish conduct is antithetical to Finnis' perception of moral behavior and 
anathema to American values of democratic-republican representation and 
governance. 
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